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ABSTRACT 
 
 The negation effect refers to the cognitive detriment associated with correctly 
saying “no” (a negation), compared to correctly saying “yes” (an affirmation). A recent 
study has shown this detriment for item memory following the negation of a feature of an 
item (Mayo, Schul, & Rosenthal, 2014). This research examines the replicability of the 
negation effect using the original paradigm, as well as an adapted list-learning paradigm. 
Participants studied a set of objects and were then asked questions about features of 
objects that elicited “yes” or “no” responses. After a filler task, participants completed a 
final memory test during which they indicated whether a given object label was present 
or not present during the study phase. 
 Experiment 1 failed to conceptually replicate the negation-induced forgetting 
effect present in Mayo et al. (2014) using a list-learning paradigm. Experiment 2 was a 
pre-registered replication, and the negation effect was successfully replicated using the 
original stimulus and test materials from Mayo et al. (2014). Experiment 3 successfully 
replicated the negation effect using a list-learning paradigm, and found that the 
magnitude of the negation effect is influenced by the number of alternatives suggested by 
a feature statement. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  
Imagine the following scene: one afternoon, you hear through your window what 
you think may be gunshots. Turning around to look, you see one man lying on the ground 
behind a car, and another man holding a gun a few feet away. You make a note of the 
gunman’s description in your head: tall, average build, white t-shirt and jeans, black 
baseball cap. While you are phoning the incident in to the police, the man with the gun 
grabs a backpack from the trunk of the car and runs away. The police arrive a few 
minutes later, and once the area is secured you are asked to make a statement. A detective 
asks you a simple question: “Was the baseball cap blue?” Your answer to this question – 
a “yes” or “no” – may later influence what you remember about the event. 
Cognitive psychologists have long been aware of the limitations and malleability 
of human memory (e.g., Loftus, 2005). An understanding of these limitations has 
informed decades of research on how memory can be altered or falsely recollected, as 
well as how memory retrieval can be improved in applied contexts (e.g., interviewing of 
witnesses and suspects). However, advances in interviewing techniques have only been 
accompanied by a partial understanding of how the type of question a person is asked can 
influence his or her memory. Studies have assessed the influence of mnemonic 
techniques (the Cognitive Interview; Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1986), 
generating verbal descriptions (the verbal overshadowing effect; Schooler & Engstler-
Schooler, 1990), suggestive questioning and social influence (e.g., Garven, Wood, 
Malpass, & Shaw, 1998; Hope, Ost, Gabbert, Healey, & Lenton, 2008), and interference 
due to selective retrieval of event information (e.g., Camp, Wesstein, & Bruin, 2012; 
Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009) on subsequent memory for an event or suspect.  One 
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aspect of questioning that has been overlooked involves the potential influence of 
negation on subsequent memory – that is, the cognitive detriment associated with 
correctly saying no to a question (negation), compared with correctly saying yes to a 
question (affirmation). 
Prior studies have primarily situated negation in a context of lexical 
comprehension, focusing on how negations themselves are communicated and 
understood; however, memory researchers utilizing manipulations requiring a “yes” or 
“no” response have also observed differences in performance based upon the response 
given. The finding that a person’s memory or comprehension can be differentially 
influenced based upon whether one responds affirmatively or negatively appears to have 
been demonstrated consistently, yet has garnered little attention. The following studies 
attempted to replicate this negation effect in memory, and to further identify factors that 
may moderate the effect. Specifically, these studies examined the influence of affirmative 
or negative responses to forced-choice, yes-no statements related to a feature of an object 
(e.g., “The glass was empty”) on subsequent memory for the object of the question. In 
this context, the negation effect encompasses a comparative memory impairment based 
upon an accurate response of “no” to questions about features of studied objects, rather 
than an accurate response of “yes.” 
The Negation Effect  
 The negation effect has been studied since the 1960s, particularly in the area of 
psycholinguistics. In this context, negations are represented as sentences describing how 
a situation is not (e.g., Susan does not bake cookies), whereas affirmations are 
represented as sentences describing the actual situation (e.g., Stephen tidied up his 
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drawers). The nature of how negations are represented and accessed, as well as how 
accessibility influences understanding and inference-making has been explored. Using 
lexical comprehension and sentence verification tasks, a “negation effect” has been 
shown when participants more quickly and more accurately verify affirmative statements 
(Gough, 1965; Wason, 1961). Negated words and phrases have also been associated with 
decreased accessibility and slower response times (Engelkemp & Hormann, 1974; Kaup 
& Zwann, 2003; MacDonald & Just, 1989; Meyer, 1975).  
 Despite years of research, the manner in which negations are represented in 
memory is still debated. Two models of negation representation that have been explored 
include the schema-plus-tag model and the fusion model. The schema-plus-tag model 
proposes that a negated message is first processed using an affirmative meaning and is 
then negated (e.g., Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004). For example, this model suggests 
that a negated statement such as “not red” would first be processed as “red” with the 
negation operator subsequently added to the representation. The fusion model, in 
contrast, proposes that the meaning of the negated phrase is the result of merging of the 
negation operator with the affirmed meaning. The phrase “the door is not open” would 
thus be represented as the fusion of “not” and “open”, or “closed.” These competing 
models of representation yield different implications for associations that are activated 
when the negated statement is processed, as well as for long-term retention of the 
meaning of the negated statement. 
To compare the two models, Mayo and colleagues (2004) examined the 
inferences participants made as different negations and affirmations were processed. 
Participants encoded affirmed target sentences (e.g., “Tom is a tidy person”) or negated 
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target sentences (e.g., “Tom is not a tidy person”) and then determined whether a probe 
sentence describing a behavior (e.g., “Tom forgets where he left his car keys”) fit the 
meaning of the target sentence. Negations in this study were presented three ways: 
semantically negated, as sentences with negation operators; visibly negated, with a red 
background that signaled that a sentence should be negated; or dually negated, as 
sentences with negation operators that were also displayed on a red background. The 
behavioral probes could be consistent with, inconsistent with, or irrelevant to the meaning 
of the target sentence. A baseline condition was included for comparison, wherein people 
first saw the behavioral probe and then assessed the congruency of the affirmed or 
negated sentences. Compared to this baseline, people were quicker to respond when the 
probe meaning was consistent with an affirmed target phrase, as well as when the probe 
meaning was inconsistent with a negated target phrase. Processing a negated message 
first as an affirmation in the schema-plus-tag model would activate associations that are 
inconsistent with the negated meaning. Thus, Mayo and colleagues (2004) suggested that 
the facilitation of incongruent associations with negated sentences in this study supports 
the schema-plus-tag model (e.g., Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006). In addition to 
representations, research into negation has extended to other areas of cognition, including 
attention and memory. 
Negation in Attention 
 Negations are a crucial element of communication, for instance in directing 
attention away from or administering instructions not to do something. The use of 
negation as a communication device can sometimes itself lead to communication errors. 
Consider the classic studies of thought suppression: when people were instructed, “don’t 
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think about white bears,” sometimes that instruction led people to paradoxically think 
about white bears (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Recently, Maciuszek 
(2013) examined the nature of negations in commands (e.g., “don’t pay attention to 
[target],”) in memory and comprehension. Attention focus, as measured by the amount of 
details recalled about the target, was found to be greater for people who received the 
negation order, compared to people in control groups who either were not told anything 
about the target, or who were not ordered to pay attention to the target. In other words, 
when participants were instructed not to pay attention to something, attention was drawn 
to the object to a greater extent.  
 Orenes, Beltrán, and Santamaría (2014) used a visual world paradigm to 
investigate how negations are understood and represented based on the situational context 
and number of available alternatives. The visual world paradigm allowed for both images 
and verbal information to be presented simultaneously, and eye movement data was 
collected to determine the focal point of attention. Four images of colored figures (red, 
green, blue, yellow) were displayed while a statement was presented. Initial statements 
that were presented to participants manipulated the situation in which figures would 
appear: either with two alternatives (“The figure could be red or green”) or with multiple 
alternatives (“The figure could be red, or green, or blue, or yellow”). Subsequent 
statements were ether phrased as affirmations (“The figure was red”) or negations (“The 
figure was not red”). When the initial statement set up a context in which multiple 
alternatives were present, people tended to direct their attention to the object of a negated 
sentence. That is, participants who were presented with the negated statement “the figure 
was not red” would focus on the red figure, rather than any of the other alternate colored 
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figures. On the other hand, when a situation implied only two alternatives, participants’ 
attention was directed to the intended color conveyed by the statement. That is, when 
presented with the negated statement, “the figure was not red,” participants focused on 
the figure of the other color present in the scenario. The attentional component of 
negation thus appears to be sensitive to the number of alternatives suggested by the 
statement, and this may differentially influence what is remembered following that 
negation.  
Negation in Memory 
 Manipulations using yes-no questions to assess memory are prevalent throughout 
the cognitive literature. While the impact of negation on subsequent memory for word 
lists has been documented in classic studies of the levels of processing effect (Craik & 
Tulving, 1975), the implications for object or event memory have only recently been 
explored (Mayo, Schul, & Rosenthal, 2014). In their original demonstration of the levels 
of processing effect, Craik and Tulving (1975) required participants to respond “yes” or 
“no” to prompts that systematically manipulated the level of semantic processing for a 
list of words – varying, for example, the physical structure of the word (e.g., “Is the word 
in capital letters?”); whether or not the target word rhymed with another (e.g., “Does the 
word rhyme with ___?”); or whether or not the target word fit a given category (e.g., “Is 
the word a type of ____?”) or syntactical structure (e.g., “Would the word fit the 
sentence: ‘_____’?”). Across several experiments, Craik and Tulving noted a consistent 
effect of response type (yes or no), with the pattern of means suggesting that words 
associated with a “yes” response were better remembered compared to words associated 
with a “no” response. Positive responses allowed for the encoding prompts to be better 
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integrated with the target items, resulting in a more elaborate memory trace. 
 More recently, Mayo, Schul, and Rosenthal (2014) demonstrated that correctly 
negating a feature of an object can subsequently impair memory for that object, compared 
to affirming a feature of the object. Mayo and colleagues examined a “negation-induced 
forgetting” effect based on the nature of a rehearsal (affirmative or negative). Participants 
were shown a video tour of an apartment and were later asked questions about features of 
items that were shown in the video. The initial memory test in Experiment 1 was 
composed of 16 questions, eight eliciting “no” responses and eight eliciting “yes” 
responses. After a 20-minute unrelated filler task, subjects completed a final recognition 
test for the objects they saw in the video. Overall, when feature questions elicited correct 
“no” responses, participants were less likely to remember the object (e.g., “ashtray”) on 
the final memory test, compared to when feature questions elicited “yes” responses (d = 
0.53 [0.19, 0.87]1). Mayo and colleagues termed this comparative memory impairment 
“negation-induced forgetting.” That is, when subjects thought about an object and 
negated it, the representation of that object was subsequently less accessible. Given the 
potential applicability of this negation impairment to domains like education and forensic 
interviewing, I sought to examine the replicability and robustness of the effect. 
Overview of the Current Studies 
 In three experiments, I examine the replicability of the negation effect in memory. 
In Experiment 1, I attempt a conceptual replication of Mayo et al. (2014) using a list-
learning paradigm. In Experiment 2, I conduct a pre-registered direct replication of Mayo 
                                                
1 The effect size was provided by the primary author, and confidence intervals for effect 
sizes were constructed using ESCI software (Cumming, 2012). 
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et al. (2014) using the original stimulus and test materials. In Experiment 3, I return to the 
list-learning paradigm to examine two potential moderators of the negation effect: 
memory load at encoding, and the number of alternatives suggested by a test statement. 
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CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 1 
 The “negation-induced forgetting” effect seen in Mayo et al. (2014) prompted a 
replication attempt using a list-learning paradigm. Subjects in the first of Mayo and 
colleagues’ (2014) experiments studied all of the stimuli (i.e., everyday household 
objects) by watching a video of a computer-simulated tour of an apartment. After 
watching the video, subjects provided “yes” and “no” responses to statements describing 
features of the objects that they had seen in the apartment. Following a 20-minute 
unrelated filler task, subjects then completed a final object recognition test.  
The following experiment examined the replicability of the negation effect when 
using a single-item presentation list-learning paradigm. Subjects in the current study were 
shown images of simple objects and presented with statements about features of those 
objects that elicited “yes” or “no” responses. To conceptually replicate the encoding 
experience of subjects in the Mayo paradigm, subjects in Experiment 1 studied a series of 
objects in sequence and were then immediately tested on the feature statements (see 
Figure 1). Following a 20-minute filler period, subjects were administered a final test 
involving either object recognition (Exp. 1A) or free recall (Exp. 1B).  
Method 
Participants. A total of 84 subjects (42.9% male) completed Experiment 1 for 
partial course credit. Mean age was 18.86 (SD = 2.28). In Experiment 1A, 49 subjects 
completed a final recognition test. In Experiment 1B, 35 subjects completed a final free 
recall test. Three subjects were excluded from the analysis in 1B due to a failure to 
follow instructions. 
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 Materials and Design. Stimuli included 32 images of simple objects retrieved 
from the Massive Visual Memory Stimuli dataset (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 
2013). Object images were selected to vary based upon the features of both an attribute 
(e.g., color) and state (e.g., open/closed). The feature statements for each studied object 
were administered via pre-recorded audio files that involved a female speaker reading the 
statements aloud. Each statement recording was between 2500ms and 3000ms. 
Statements that were presented to participants can be found in Appendix A.  
This study employed a within-subjects design manipulating response to feature 
questions on an initial memory test (yes or no)2. Object memory was assessed via 
performance on a final memory test. In Experiment 1A, subjects indicated that an object 
was “Present” or “Not Present” in the study phase on a final recognition test. In 
Experiment 1B, subjects freely recalled all of the items that they could remember seeing 
in the study phase.  
 Procedure. This study was divided into three phases: a study phase, an initial test 
phase, and a final test phase. A schematic representation of the procedure can be found in 
Figure 1. Prior to the first phase, subjects provided informed consent and received 
instructions about the experiment. Specifically, they were instructed that they would 
study a set of simple objects and be asked questions about features of those objects at a 
later time. They were not informed that they would take a final test with regard to the 
                                                
2 This condition was independent of another study manipulation in which the yes/no 
questions were presented immediately prior to encoding an image, similar to the 
paradigm used by Craik & Tulving (1975). For subjects in that pre-encoding condition, 
there was no significant negation effect in either recognition (d = .02 [-.28, .23]) or recall 
(d = .45 [-.14, 1.03]). For the purpose of this paper, I focus the discussion on this post-
encoding manipulation of negation, consistent with the Mayo et al. (2014) paradigm. 
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images that they studied. The remaining instructions and tasks were presented to subjects 
via E-Prime 2.0TM. 
 Subjects were randomly assigned to a condition prior to arriving for the 
experiment. In the study phase, subjects studied the full set of 32 objects for 250ms each 
with a 1000ms ISI. Following the presentation of all object images, subjects completed 
the initial test phase, which was comprised of feature statements that described correct or 
incorrect attributes of the studied objects. These feature statements were randomly 
divided into “yes” or “no” responses, and counterbalanced so that each object was 
equally associated with both responses across all conditions.  
 Immediately following the study phase, all subjects completed an unrelated 20-
min filler task that required them to locate sequences of numbers vertically, horizontally, 
or diagonally, similar to a word search. Next, subjects completed a final object memory 
test. In Experiment 1A, this final test was a recognition test: subjects were shown simple 
object labels (e.g., “highlighter”) and were asked to indicate whether that object was 
present or not present in the first part of the study. The final recognition test was 
comprised of 64 object labels – half of these object labels corresponded to the 32 studied 
objects from the first phase of the experiment (and thus elicited correct “Present” 
responses), while the other half corresponded to new, unstudied objects (and thus elicited 
correct “Not Present” responses). The order of presentation for test items was determined 
randomly for each subject. For each item, subjects were also asked to provide a 
confidence estimate and phenomenological memory (i.e., remember-know-guess) 
judgment. Confidence was assessed using a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 corresponding to “not 
sure at all” and 5 corresponding to “definitely sure” that the object was or was not 
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studied. Subjects were provided instructions with respect to remember/know/guess 
responses and were asked to choose between “I (would have) recollected seeing the 
object”, “The object is (not) familiar to me”, and “I am guessing” for each decision on 
whether an object was studied.3 Specific instructions can be found in Appendix B. The 
order of presenting confidence and memory basis judgments was counterbalanced such 
that half of the subjects first rated confidence and then provided the memory basis 
judgment, while the other half first provided a memory basis judgment and then the 
confidence rating.  
The final test in Experiment 1B involved a free recall test. Subjects were given as 
much time as they needed to list objects recalled from the first part of the experiment. 
Subjects were prompted twice to recall all of the objects they could remember studying. 
Free recall responses were coded by a research assistant blind to the images used in the 
study. A response was counted as correct/present if the research assistant could discern 
what object was being named, even if the label was not a perfect fit. For instance, the 
terms “marker” and “highlighter” would both be considered as correct for “highlighter”. 
After completing the final memory test, subjects were debriefed and dismissed from the 
study.  
Given my interest in replicating the negation-induced forgetting effect in Mayo et 
al. (2014), I will report Bayes Factors (BF10) in addition to the traditional null hypothesis 
significance tests (NHST). Bayes factors enable the comparison of evidence strength for 
two models: one in which there is no significant negation effect (the null hypothesis, 
                                                
3 Subjects provided these responses for both “old” and “new” responses. In the results, I 
focus on the phenomenological memory judgments for only correct “old” responses. 
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Model 0), and one in which there is a significant effect (the alternative hypothesis, Model 
1). The BF10 factor will be used to express the probability of the data given the alternative 
hypothesis (Model 1) relative to the probability of the data given the null hypothesis 
(Model 0). However, when this value is less than 1, I will invert it for interpretation. For 
the subject-level effects, I will use the effect size for Mayo et al. (2014) Experiment 1 as 
provided by the primary author, d = 0.53 [0.19, 0.87], as the prior distribution. For the 
item-level analyses, I will use the standard Cauchy prior of 0.707 to calculate BF10. The 
magnitude of BF10 can be used to interpret the strength of the evidence: a factor of 0 to 3 
is considered anecdotal evidence; 3 to 10 is considered substantial evidence; 10 to 100 is 
considered strong evidence; while a factor greater than 100 is considered decisive 
evidence (Jeffreys, 1961).  
Results – Experiment 1A 
 Initial Memory Test. The initial memory test was used to elicit “yes” and “no”  
responses from participants. It consisted of 32 statements pertaining to features of objects 
that were studied. Half of the statements described correct features of the objects and 
required “yes” responses; the other half described incorrect features of the objects and 
were correctly answered with “no” responses. A paired-samples t-test was used to assess 
the influence of initial memory test response (yes, no) on the proportion of accurate 
responses to the feature statements. Subjects were similarly accurate for statements 
requiring a “yes” response (M = .72, SE = .02) and for statements requiring a “no” 
response (M = .70, SE = .02), t(48) = 1.52, p = .14, d = 0.17 [-0.05, 0.40]. 
 Final Memory Test.  Two outcome measures were of primary interest: (1) 
conditionalized errors on the final memory test, and (2) phenomenological memory bases 
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for accurately recognized objects on the final memory test. For each person, the 
proportion of conditionalized errors made on the final memory test was calculated. 
Conditionalized errors refer to items that were associated with a correct response on the 
initial memory test, but were responded to as “Not Present” on the final memory test. 
Proportions of Remember and Know responses were also calculated for objects correctly 
recognized as having been present in the first part of the experiment. Know responses 
were corrected for independence of the two processes by dividing the number of Know 
responses (K) by the opportunities to respond Know (1 – R; see Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1995).  
 A paired-samples t-test was used to assess the influence of initial memory test 
response (yes, no) on the proportion of errors on the final memory test (i.e., studied items 
that were correctly answered on the initial test but were not recognized as having been 
studied in the first part of the experiment). Although numerically more errors were made 
following “no” responses (M = .10, SE = .02) than following “yes” responses (M = .07, 
SE = .01), a statistically significant negation effect was not observed, t(48) = 1.49, p = 
.14, d = .27 [-.09, .62].  
To further examine the null effect, a Bayesian paired-samples t-test was 
conducted using JASP software (JASP Team, 2016). An estimated BF10 of 0.54 suggests 
that the data were 1.85 times more likely under the null hypothesis, which is considered 
weak evidence. In addition to these subject-level analyses, an item-level analysis was 
conducted to determine if a negation effect was present across the 32 target items. When 
examined at an item-level, there was a marginally significant negation effect, t(31) = 
2.03, p = .05, d = 0.38 [.01, .74]. An estimated BF10 of 1.15 suggests that the data were 
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1.15 times more likely under the alternative hypothesis on an item-level. Again, this 
Bayes Factor is considered weak or anecdotal evidence. 
 The second measure of interest involved the basis upon which subjects correctly 
recognized objects. A paired-samples t-test was used to assess the influence of initial 
memory test response (yes, no) on the proportion of accurately recognized objects based 
on remembering and knowing. No differences in recollection responses were observed 
following “yes” (M = .85, SE = .02) vs. “no” responses (M = .84, SE = .03), t(48) = .48, p 
= .63, d = 0.07 [-0.22, 0.35]; nor were differences observed in familiarity responses 
following “yes” responses (M = .55, SE = .07) vs. “no” responses (M = .58, SE = .07), 
t(48) = .39, p = .70, d = 0.06 [-0.37, 0.25].  
Results – Experiment 1B  
 Initial Memory Test. A paired-samples t-test was used to assess the influence of 
initial memory test response (yes, no) on the proportion of accurate responses to the 
feature statements. Subjects were similarly accurate for statements requiring a “yes” 
response (M = .71, SE = .02) and for statements requiring a “no” response (M = .69, SE = 
.02), t(31) = .93, p = .36, d = 0.18 [-0.20, 0.55]. 
 Final Memory Test. A paired-samples t-test was used to assess the influence of 
initial memory test response (yes, no) on the proportion of studied objects correctly 
recalled. This measure was conditionalized for accuracy on the initial test, such that only 
objects correctly answered with “yes” or “no” on the initial test were included in the final 
proportion recalled. Subjects recalled fewer objects associated with a “no” response (M = 
.29, SE = .02) than those associated with a “yes” response (M = .32, SE = .03); however, 
this difference was not significant, t(31) = 1.04, p = .31, d = .21 [-.14, .56]. An estimated 
16 
 
 
BF10 of 0.39 suggests that the data were 2.58 more likely under the null hypothesis. An 
item-level analysis was used to determine if a negation effect was present across the 32 
target items. The item analysis revealed a significant negation effect, t(31) = 2.28, p = 
.03, d = -0.81 [-1.52, -.08]. More objects were correctly recalled after a “yes” response 
(M = .59, SE = .04) than after a “no” response (M = .41, SE = .04). An estimated BF10 of 
1.79 indicates that the data provided weak evidence for the alternative hypothesis on an 
item-level.   
Discussion 
The present studies failed to find a significant negation effect for either 
conditionalized errors on a final recognition test (1A) or for conditionalized accuracy on 
a final free recall test (1B). A similar effect size for the negation effect was observed for 
both recognition, d = .27 [-.09, .62] and recall, d = .21 [-.14, .56]. While these effects fall 
within the confidence intervals of the original effect produced by Mayo et al. (2014) 
[0.19, 0.87], they are at the lower end of the distribution and were about half the size 
original effect (d = 0.53). Bayes factors (BF10 = 0.54 and 0.39, respectively) suggested 
only weak evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. Despite the presence of a negation 
effect in an item-level analyses, the lack of subject-level effects takes precedence in the 
interpretation of the negation effect’s non-significance (e.g., Raaijmakers, 
Schrijnemakers, & Gremmen, 1999). 
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Table 1 
Means for final test measures in Experiment 1A (false rejection, accurate recognition) 
and Experiment 1B (proportion recalled) 
 After “yes” After “no” 
Measure Mean SD Mean SD 
False Rejection     
Proportion Errors .07 .10 .10 .11 
Confidence 2.76 1.00 2.61 1.02 
Accurate Recognition     
Response Latency 1525 314 1612 431 
Confidence 4.68 .28 4.59 .28 
Remember .85 .15 .84 .18 
Know (Corrected) .55 .48 .58 .47 
Proportion Recalled     
Accurate .32 .15 .29 .13 
 
 
  
18 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphic representation of the procedure used in the present Experiment 1 to 
conceptually replicate the procedure used in Experiment 1 of Mayo, Schul, & Rosenthal 
(2014). 
 
Figure 2. Effect sizes with 95% confidence intervals for Mayo et al. (2014), Experiment 
1A (recognition test), and Experiment 1B (recall test). 
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 attempted a direct replication of Mayo et al.’s (2014) Experiment 1, 
using the original stimuli and test materials. Following the failed conceptual replication, I 
contacted the primary author and requested her materials. I also clarified the type of filler 
task and items used as lures on the final recognition test to elaborate on the concise 
description provided in the original article. The primary author reviewed the procedure to 
verify the similarity between my proposed method and the complete method used in the 
original experiment. Experiment 2 was thus a direct replication using the translated 
materials (from Hebrew to English) published in the original paper, as well as those 
obtained from the primary author. This study was pre-registered via the Open Science 
Framework prior to beginning data collection as part of the Pre-Registration Challenge 
(osf.io/p2qfv; Spies et al., 2012). As I pre-registered only a laboratory sample, I will first 
present the results for the pre-registered sample (Experiment 2a) and then discuss the 
additional unregistered online sample (Experiment 2b).  
Method 
 Sampling Plan and Participants. The sampling plan was based on a power 
analysis to detect a small to medium effect size. Using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009), a 
planned sample size of n = 68 was calculated to achieve power of 0.90 using a two-tailed 
dependent t-test, given a small to medium effect size. 
In total, the pre-registered laboratory sample (Experiment 2a) was comprised of 
75 students (45.3% male) from Iowa State University, who participated in this 
experiment for partial course credit. Mean age was 19.54 (SD = 1.05). Due to a program 
error, demographic information is missing for one subject. Data from ten subjects was 
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excluded from analysis due to subjects being non-native English speakers (N = 9) or 
being identified as multivariate outliers via Mahalanobis distance (N = 1; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996)4.  
Additionally, 80 subjects (41.40% male) completed an unregistered online sample 
(Experiment 2b) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Mean age was 35.49 (SD = 10.49). 
Workers were paid $1.00 to complete the task. Data from ten subjects were excluded 
from the online sample for failing to respond correctly to attention checks. 
Materials. This experiment was presented to subjects in the laboratory using E-
Prime 2.0TM, and to subjects on Mechanical Turk via Qualtrics. The video presented in 
this study involves an 8 min, 15 s video provided by the primary author of the original 
experiment (Mayo et al., 2014). The video depicted a tour of the upstairs and downstairs 
portions of a digitally simulated apartment. Present in the video were a number of 
everyday household objects. The original experiment instructions and test items used in 
Experiment 2 can be found in Appendix C and Appendix D, respectively. Four different 
randomizations of the initial test were programmed and counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Design and Procedure. This study was a fully within-subjects design, 
manipulating yes-no responses to statements on an initial memory test. Only slight 
variations in the procedure were present in the online study (when compared with the 
                                                
4 The original study eliminated the few subjects who erred in more than 50% of initial 
memory test statements. The registration overlooked the exclusion of these subjects. I 
performed the analyses with these subjects (N = 6) and without, and the conclusions did 
not change. To be consistent with the pre-registration, the results presented here include 
the 6 subjects who were less than 50% accurate on the initial memory test. 
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laboratory version). Subjects provided informed consent and were told that they would 
view a brief film and answer questions about it. Prior to beginning the experiment, 
subjects in the online sample also answered a set of attention check questions (e.g., “Who 
is the current president of the United States?”) to ensure that subjects attended throughout 
the duration of the study. With the exception of an additional set of attention check 
questions present after the filler task was completed, the remainder of the procedure did 
not differ between the laboratory and online samples.  
After receiving instructions for how to proceed, subjects were instructed to view 
the stimulus video. They were then told that they would complete a short memory task 
involving a series of sentences. The task was comprised of 16 feature statements that 
described either congruent features of objects in the apartment, and were thus correctly 
answered with “yes” responses, or incongruent features of objects in the apartment, and 
were thus correctly answered with “no” responses. The questions were randomly split 
twice, and in each random split the correct “yes” and “no” responses were 
counterbalanced, resulting in four randomization conditions. After responding to all 16 
statements, participants completed a 20-minute unrelated filler task comprised of a word-
construction task in which participants were presented with 15-character words in 
English (e.g., “overadjustments”) and were instructed via the computer program to 
generate as many new words as possible using only the letters in the given base word 
(e.g., “random”, “mentors”, etc.). Subjects were given 4 min to generate as many words 
as possible for each of five base words. 
Once all five base words had been completed, subjects were administered a final 
object recognition test in which they were presented with a series of object labels (e.g., 
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“chair”) and asked to indicate whether the object was seen in the video. Items on the final 
test included the 16 tested objects on the initial memory test, as well as 16 novel objects 
that were not featured in the video. The 32 objects on the final test were identical to those 
used by Mayo and colleagues (2014). After completing the final test, subjects were 
debriefed and dismissed from the study. 
Results – Experiment 2A 
 Initial Memory Test. The initial memory test consisted of 16 statements 
pertaining to features of objects seen in the apartment video. Half of the statements 
described correct features of the objects and required “yes” responses; the other half 
described incorrect features of the objects and were correctly answered with “no” 
responses. Accuracy on the initial memory test refers to the proportion of correct “yes” 
and “no” responses to the feature statements. Subjects were more accurate for statements 
requiring a “no” response (M = .75, SE = .02) than for statements requiring a “yes” 
response (M = .65, SE = .03), t(64) = 3.07, p = .003, d = 0.53 [.18, .88]. This effect is 
inconsistent with Mayo et al. (2014) – there was no difference between “yes” and “no” 
response accuracy on the initial test in the original experiment. 
 Final Memory Test. The final memory test consisted of 32 object labels 
pertaining to 16 tested objects that were present in the video, as well as 16 novel objects 
that were not present in the video. Subjects indicated whether the object was present or 
not present in the apartment that they viewed. Accuracy on this final test was calculated 
as the proportion of the 32 test items correctly indicated as being present (critical items) 
or not present (lure items) in the video. Subjects were mostly accurate on this test (M = 
.85, SD = .19). 
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The measure of primary interest is that of errors on the final memory test: objects 
that were present in the video that were incorrectly categorized as “not present” on the 
final memory test. This measure was conditionalized for accuracy on the first test, such 
that only items that subjects correctly answered with “yes” or “no” on the initial memory 
test were included in the analysis. For both “yes” and “no” responses, the proportion of 
target objects that were correctly responded to on the initial memory test but were not 
recognized as having been present on the final test was calculated. Consistent with Mayo 
et al. (2014), subjects demonstrated a significant negation effect such that target objects 
associated with “no” responses (M = .14, SE = .02) produced more errors in memory, 
compared to target objects associated with “yes” responses (M = .07, SE = .02), t(64) = 
3.08, p = .003, d = 0.50 [.17, .82]. An estimated BF10 of 11.16 suggests strong evidence 
for the alternative hypothesis (the presence of a negation effect) for a subject-level 
analysis. An item-level analysis was conducted separately to determine if the negation 
effect was present across the 16 target items. A paired-samples t-test found only a 
marginally significant negation effect, t(15) = 2.01, p = .06, d = .60 [-.04, 1.23] 5. An 
estimated BF10 of 1.26 suggests anecdotal evidence for an item-level negation effect in 
the laboratory sample. 
Results – Experiment 2B 
 Initial Memory Test. With regard to the initial memory test involve yes-no 
responses, accuracy was again greater for statements requiring a “no” response (M = .66, 
SE = .02) than for statements requiring a “yes” response (M = .56, SE = .03), t(69) = 2.51, 
                                                
5 The registration also overlooked the item-level analysis. I present it here to be 
consistent with the results presented in Mayo et al. (2014). 
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p = .014, d = 0.46 [.09, .82]. Although this effect is inconsistent with Mayo et al. (2014), 
it replicates what was observed in the laboratory sample in Experiment 2A. 
Final Memory Test. Performance on the final memory test was assessed with the 
same measure of conditionalized errors. For each item type (yes, no), a proportion was 
calculated of objects that were correctly answered on the first test, but were incorrectly 
categorized as “not present” on the final memory test. Similar to the laboratory sample, 
subjects demonstrated a significant negation effect: objects associated with “no” 
responses (M = .16, SE = .02) produced more errors in memory, compared to objects 
associated with “yes” responses (M = .08, SE = .02), t(69) = 2.54, p = .014, d = 0.41 [.17, 
.65]. An estimated BF10 of 3.04 suggests substantial evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis (the presence of a negation effect) for this subject-level analysis. An item-
level analysis was conducted separately to determine if the negation effect was present 
across the 16 target items. A paired-samples t-test found a significant negation effect, 
t(15) = 2.88, p = .01, d = .88 [.19, 1.55]. Objects associated with a “no” response were 
more likely to be incorrectly responded to as “Not Present” (M = .16, SE = .03) than were 
objects associated with a “yes” response (M = .07, SE = .02). On an item-level, an 
estimated BF10 of 4.90 suggests substantial evidence for the presence of the negation 
effect. 
Results – Combined Samples Analysis (Experiments 2a and 2b) 
 The same pattern of results on the final test was observed for both the laboratory 
(Experiment 2a) and online (Experiment 2b) samples, as confirmed by a 2 x 2 mixed 
model ANOVA assessing the influence of sample (laboratory, online) and response to 
feature statements (yes, no) on conditionalized final memory test errors. No main effect 
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of sample was observed, F(1, 133) = .23, p = .63, nor an interaction between yes-no 
response and sample, F(1, 133) = .01, p = .94. However, consistent with the original 
Mayo et al. (2014) study, a significant negation effect was found such that target objects 
associated with “no” responses (M = .15, SE = .02) produced more errors in memory 
compared to target objects associated with “yes” responses (M = .08, SE = .01), F(1, 133) 
= 14.93, p < .001, d = 0.45 [0.21, 0.68]. An estimated BF10 of 124.10 suggests that the 
data were 124.10 times more likely under the alternative hypothesis, which exceeds the 
threshold for decisive evidence (greater than BF10 = 100) of the negation effect.  
An item-level analysis was conducted separately to determine if the negation 
effect was present across the 16 target items. A paired-samples t-test found a significant 
negation effect, t(15) = 2.70, p = .02, d = .81 [.27, 1.34]. On an item-level, more items 
associated with “no” responses (M = .16, SE = .03) were erroneously indicated as Not 
Present on the final test than were items associated with “yes” (M = .08, SE = .02) 
responses. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 was a direct replication of the negation-induced forgetting effect 
using Mayo et al.’s (2014) original materials and instructions from Experiment 1. In 
addition to the pre-registered laboratory sample (Experiment 2a), an online sample using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk was included (Experiment 2b). The primary interest was in 
replicating the negation effect; however, I was also interested in examining the difference 
in effect size between the Mechanical Turk sample and a traditional laboratory sample. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated Mechanical Turk’s validity as a data collection tool 
(e.g., Mason & Suri, 2012). The observed negation effect did not significantly differ 
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across the samples: the laboratory sample demonstrated a slightly larger effect size, d = 
.50 [.17, .82], when compared with the online sample, d = .41 [.17, .65], however, the 
confidence intervals suggest the magnitude of the effect does not differ between the 
samples (see Figure 3). These findings add further support to the validation of Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk as an effective pool of subjects. 
 In recent years, replication has become a priority in psychological research, 
including establishing guidelines for conducting replications (e.g., the “replication 
recipe,” Brandt et al., 2014). I was able to replicate the negation effect using the original 
stimulus and test materials from Mayo and colleagues. Although the observed effect size 
was marginally smaller in magnitude, the upper limit of the confidence interval 
encompasses the observed effect size from the Mayo et al. (2014) Experiment 1 (see 
Figure 3). Thus, this replication is best described as a successful replication: the effect 
size of the replication was significantly different from the null, and similar to the original 
effect size.  
 While the Mayo et al. (2014) paradigm is effective in producing the negation 
effect, there may be external factors that influenced the size of the effect produced in the 
present replication. Most notably is the potential influence of language. The original 
study was conducted in Hebrew, while the materials in publication and those provided by 
the author involved translations into English. However, I cannot identify a theoretical 
reason that language differences would have resulted in a smaller effect size. Another 
general limitation is that Mayo and colleagues did not collect confidence or memory 
basis judgments. Following the successful replication of the effect, I returned to a list-
learning paradigm to examine potential moderators of the negation effect. 
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Table 2 
Means for final memory test errors in Experiment 2 
 After “yes” After “no” 
Experiment Mean SD Mean SD 
Experiment 2A .07 .15 .14 .15 
Experiment 2B .08 .18 .16 .19 
Combined Samples .08 .16 .15 .17 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the direct replication in a laboratory 
(Experiment 2A) and online (Experiment 2B) samples.  
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 3 
Following the failure to demonstrate a negation effect in Experiments 1A and 1B, 
I corresponded with the primary author and more closely examined the procedures and 
materials used in Mayo et al. (2014). Upon reviewing the stimulus video shown to 
participants in the original study, I hypothesized that the discrepant findings between the 
original experiment and the conceptual replication may have been related to differences 
in how the stimuli were presented to subjects. Specifically, Mayo et al. (2014) 
demonstrated a significant negation effect using a video tour of an apartment. This video 
included a large number of household objects and furniture, 16 of which were chosen to 
be tested after the presentation of the video. I estimated that for every object that was 
tested, there were 3 to 4 items present within the apartment that were not tested.  
The replication efforts in Experiment 1 utilized the same basic principles of the 
paradigm in Mayo et al. (2014) – a number of objects presented to subjects, followed by 
an initial memory test, then a 20-minute filler task, and lastly a final memory test. 
However, the paradigm in Experiment 1 did not include additional non-tested items 
during the study task. The presence of the non-tested objects in the Mayo et al. (2014) 
paradigm may have resulted in an increased memory load for those subjects that was not 
present in the Experiment 1 single-item presentation paradigm. That is, subjects’ task in 
Mayo et al. (2014) may have been more difficult due to encoding necessarily being 
distributed over more items (both the target items and the non-tested items). In the 
misinformation literature, people have been shown to be more susceptible to 
misinformation when memory quality is degraded, due to factors such as the passage of 
time (e.g., Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978) or centrality at encoding (e.g., Wilford, Chan, & 
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Tuhn, 2014; or Wright & Stroud, 1998). Following this logic, the distribution of encoding 
over more items in Mayo et al. (2014) may have resulted in decreased memory strength 
for those participants. Experiment 3 thus varied the number of items present at encoding 
in order to determine if the magnitude of the negation effect would be greater for subjects 
with an increased memory load, presumably weakening the strength of subjects’ memory. 
 A second factor that I examined as a possible moderator of the negation effect 
relates to the potential number of alternatives associated with a response to a yes-no 
question. The effect of negation on attention has been shown to be differentially 
influenced when the negation context implies two alternatives or multiple alternatives 
(Orenes et al., 2014). When multiple alternatives were suggested by a context, subjects 
were more likely to direct their attention in a manner that facilitated negation effects. 
Further, negated behavioral descriptions associated with less accessible opposing 
constructs (i.e., with multiple alternatives) have been shown to be more susceptible to 
memory errors than descriptions associated with easily available opposing constructs 
(Mayo et al., 2004). To examine this factor in Experiment 3, I varied the number of 
alternatives that a yes-no question prompted. On the initial memory test, I manipulated 
whether the feature statement had a pre-defined opposite construct that easily comes to 
mind (e.g., “not open” à “closed”), or if the feature statement was instead associated 
with multiple alternatives (e.g., “not red” à “blue” “green” “purple”, etc.). Two-option 
features statements did have an opposite construct accessible (e.g., full/empty, 
open/closed) and multi-option feature statements did not have an accessible opposite 
representation (e.g., colors, shapes, type). Given the previous findings that negations 
associated with multi-option constructs can paradoxically increase attention to a negated 
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object (Orenes et al., 2014) and can lead to more meaning-based memory errors (Mayo et 
al, 2004), I hypothesized that negations associated with multiple alternatives would result 
in more errors on the final memory test. To my knowledge, this factor has not been tested 
within an object recognition paradigm, thus precluding a more sophisticated theoretical 
prediction. 
Method 
 Participants. Using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009), I calculated a planned 
sample size of n = 136 for achieving power of 0.90 in a within-between interaction using 
a repeated measures ANOVA, given a small to medium effect size. In total, 190 students 
(46.3% male) from Iowa State University participated in this experiment for partial 
course credit. Mean age was 19.35 (SD = 1.05). Due to a program error, demographic 
information is missing for two subjects. Eleven subjects were excluded from the final 
analysis for being non-native English speakers (N = 8) or being color-blind (N = 3). After 
exclusion, the between-subject conditions were not equal, with the load-present condition 
having slightly fewer (N = 88) than the load-absent condition (N = 91)6. 
 Materials and Design. The number of stimuli used in this experiment was 
increased to 48 images of objects from the Massive Visual Memory Stimuli dataset 
(Brady et al., 2013). Object images were chosen such that they varied based upon the 
features of emptiness and openness (two-option features), as well as type, color, and 
shape (multi-option features). The feature statements created for the studied objects were 
                                                
6 I performed the analyses with and without subjects who were less than 50% accurate on 
the initial memory test (N = 6), and the results did not change.  
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administered via pre-recorded audio files of a female speaker reading the statements 
aloud. Each statement recording was between 2500ms and 3500ms.  
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design was used to assess the influence of memory load 
(present or absent), number of possible alternatives (two-option or multi-option), and 
response to feature statements (yes or no) on object memory. Memory load was 
manipulated between-subjects, allowing for an experimental assessment of the 4:1 ratio 
of distractor objects to target objects I estimated from the Mayo et al. (2014) stimulus 
video. Half of the subjects in Experiment 3 encoded only the 48 tested objects (load-
absent condition), and the other half studied the 48 tested objects and 144 additional 
distractor objects (load-present condition). The variables number of possible alternatives 
and responses to the feature statements were both manipulated within-subjects. Object 
memory was assessed via performance on a final recognition test wherein subjects 
indicated that an object was “Present” or “Not Present” from the study phase.  
For each memory load group, subjects encountered one of four types of questions 
per trial: yes, multi-option (questions that elicit a “yes” response and did not call to mind 
a specific opposing representation of a construct; e.g., “The canister was pink”); yes, two-
option (questions that elicit a “yes” response and are associated with an easily accessible 
opposing construct; e.g., “The mp3 player was turned on”); no, multi-option (questions 
that elicit a “no” response and do not call to mind a particular opposing representation of 
a construct; e.g., “The street sign was rectangular”); and no, two-option (questions that 
elicit a “no” response and are associated with an easily accessible opposing construct; 
e.g., “The pencil cup was empty”). See Appendix E for the full set of questions that were 
used in Experiment 3.  
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Procedure. The experiment was divided into three phases: a study phase, an 
initial test phase, and a final test phase. The initial test and final test phases were 
separated by a 20-min filler task. Subjects were randomly assigned to either the load-
present or load-absent conditions.  
Prior to the beginning the experiment, subjects provided informed consent and 
were instructed that they would be asked to study a set of pictures of objects. Subjects 
then began the study phase, during which they studied either 48 objects (load-absent) or 
196 objects (load-present) for 1000ms7 each, with a 1000ms ISI between object 
presentations. After studying all of the objects, subjects began the initial memory test. 
This test was comprised of 48 feature statements that required a yes/no response. Half of 
the statements were correctly responded to with “yes” and half were correctly responded 
to with “no.” Further, half of the feature statements referred to a multi-option construct 
while the remaining half referred to a two-option construct. Questions were 
counterbalanced so that across the experiment, each object was associated with each 
response type (yes or no). After responding to all 48 features statements, subjects 
completed the same word-construction filler task used in Experiment 2 (cf. Mayo et al., 
2014).  
The final test phase followed the 20-min filler task period. Subjects completed an 
object recognition test comprised of 96 object labels that they were to categorize as 
“Present” or “Not Present” in the study phase. Forty-eight of the object labels 
                                                
7 Various encoding times were pilot tested in Experiment 1, ranging from 5000ms to 250 
ms. Encoding time variations did not drastically alter initial test accuracy (83% to 92%) 
but did often lead to ceiling effects for final test accuracy (87% to 93%) that may have 
prevented the detection of a negation effect. 
33 
 
 
corresponded to the 48 target objects from the study phase for both the load-absent and 
load-present conditions, and would thus be correctly categorized as “Present”. The 
remaining 48 object labels on the final test corresponded to novel filler objects that were 
neither target objects nor distractor objects (in the load-present condition), and would 
thus be correctly categorized as “Not Present”. For each judgment, subjects were asked to 
indicate their confidence in that decision on a half-range scale of 50% to 100% in 10%-
increments. Further, for objects categorized as “Present” subjects were asked to indicate 
the basis (i.e., remember, know or guess) on which they made that recognition decision. 
Prior to beginning the test, subjects were given instructions as to what constituted a 
“Remember” vs. a “Know” judgment. These instructions were adapted from the 
instructions used in Meissner, Brigham, and Butz (2005) and can be found in Appendix 
F. When subjects completed the final recognition test, they were debriefed and dismissed 
from the study. 
Results 
  Initial Memory Test. The initial memory test consisted of 48 statements 
pertaining to features of objects that were presented in the study phase. Half of the 
statements described correct features of the objects and required “yes” responses; the 
other half described incorrect features of the objects and were correctly answered with 
“no” responses. Additionally, half of the statements referred to a feature with multiple 
alternatives, and half referred to a feature with two alternatives. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-model 
ANOVA was used to assess the influence of memory load (present, absent), number of 
possible alternatives (two-option, multi-option), and response to feature statements (yes, 
no) on the proportion of correct “yes” and “no” responses to the feature statements. As 
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expected, subjects in the load-absent condition (M = .75, SE = .01) performed 
significantly better on the test than subjects in the load-present condition (M = .67, SE = 
.01), F(1, 177) = 23.68, p < .01, ηp2 = .12. Subjects were also significantly more accurate 
when feature statements referred to multi-option features (M = .72, SE = .01) rather than 
two-option features (M = .70, SE = .01), F(1, 177) = 5.94, p = .02, ηp2 = .03. Finally, as 
found previously, subjects were more accurate for statements requiring a “no” response 
(M = .72, SE = .01) than for statements requiring a “yes” response (M = .70, SE = .01), 
F(1, 177) = 4.11, p = .04, ηp2 = .02. Neither the three-way interaction (F(1, 177) = 2.59, p 
= .11, ηp2 = .01), the response x load interaction (F(1, 177) = .36, p = .55, ηp2 < .01), the 
number of alternatives x load interaction (F(1, 177) = 1.38, p = .24, ηp2 < .01), nor the 
response x number of alternatives interaction (F(1, 177) = .03, p = .86, ηp2 < .01) were 
significant. 
Final Memory Test. The primary measure of interest on the 96-item final object 
recognition test involved conditionalized errors in performance – that is, studied objects 
that were correctly answered on the initial test, but incorrectly categorized as “Not 
Present” on the final test. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA assessed the influence of 
memory load (present, absent), number of possible alternatives (two-option, multi-
option), and response to feature statements (yes, no) on the proportion of studied objects 
incorrectly categorized as “Not Present’ on the final memory test. This proportion was 
conditionalized by accuracy on the first test, such that only objects that subjects had 
correctly responded to on the initial memory test were included in the final proportion. 
The number of alternatives associated with a feature did not significantly contribute to 
final memory test errors, F (1, 177) = .69, p = .41, ηp2 < .01; however, main effects of 
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memory load and negation were observed. Specifically, subjects in the load-present 
condition made significantly more errors on the final memory test (M = .18, SE = .02) 
than did subjects in the load-absent condition (M = .11, SE = .02), F(1, 177) = 8.80, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .05. Subjects demonstrated a significant negation effect, such that objects that 
were associated with a “no” response were less likely to be correctly remembered (M = 
.18, SE = .01) than objects that were associated with a “yes” response (M = .12, SE = 
.01), F(1, 177) = 33. 53, p < .001, d = 0.36 [.23, .48].  
Memory load did not moderate the negation effect, as evidenced by the non-
significant memory load x response type interaction, F(1, 177) = 2.72, p = .10, ηp2 = .02. 
However, there was a significant number of alternatives x response type interaction, F(1, 
177) = 4.86, p = .03, ηp2 = .03. There was no difference in conditionalized errors after a 
correct “yes” response on the initial test for objects tested with two-option feature 
statements (M = .12, SE = .01) or with multi-option feature statements (M = .11, SE = 
.01), t(178) = .91, p = .37. However, there was a significant increase in errors after a 
correct “no” response for objects tested with multi-option feature statements (M = .19, SE 
= .01), compared to objects tested with two-option feature statements (M = .16, SE = .02), 
t(178) = 2.14, p = .03 (see Figure 4). The effect size for feature statements regarding a 
multi-option construct, d = 0.43 [.29, .58], was twice that of the effect for statements 
regarding a two-option construct, d = 0.20 [.06, .34], though both proved significant 
effects. Neither the number of alternatives x load interaction (F(1, 177) = .07, p = .79, ηp2 
< .01) nor the three-way interaction (F(1, 177) = 1.12, p = .29, ηp2 < .01) were significant.  
Bayesian paired-samples t-tests were conducted separately for the multi-option 
and two-option constructs. Again, the Cauchy prior used in calculating the factors was 
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0.53, the effect size present in the Mayo et al. (2014) study. An estimated BF10 of 5.45 in 
the two-option condition suggested that the data were 5.45 times more likely under the 
alternative hypothesis (negation effect), which is substantial evidence. For feature 
statements associated with a multi-option construct, a BF10 of well over 100 (1,694,000) 
suggested that the data were decisive evidence for the presence of the negation effect. 
An item-level analysis was also conducted to determine if the negation effect was 
present across the 48 target items. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA was used to 
compare the influence of memory load (present, absent), number of possible alternatives 
(two-option, multi-option), and response to feature statements (yes, no) on the measure of 
conditionalized errors on an item-level. There was no main effect of number of 
alternatives, F(1, 92) = .09, p = .77. However, there was a main effect of memory load, 
F(1, 92) = 13.50, p < .001, d = 0.75 [.33, 1.16]. Similar to the subject-level analysis, there 
were significantly more conditionalized errors for subjects in the load-present condition 
(M = .17, SE = .01) than in the load-absent condition (M = .11, SE = .01). A significant 
negation effect was observed, F(1, 92) = 30.43, p < .001, d = 0.69 [.39, .99]. Objects 
associated with a “no” response on the initial memory test produced more memory errors 
(M = .17, SE = .01) than did objects associated with a “yes” response on the initial 
memory test (M = .11, SE = .01). On an item-level, an estimated BF10 of 2419 suggested 
there is decisive evidence for the presence of a negation effect. 
 The other measure of interest assessed subject’s phenomenological memory basis 
(i.e., RKG judgments) for correctly recognized objects on the final memory test. Several 
data points were missing for subjects who did not correctly recognize any objects 
associated with multiple alternatives (N = 1) or with two alternatives (N = 2) following a 
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correct “no” response on the initial test. Subjective memory basis judgments (remember, 
know, or guess responses) were provided by subjects for all “Present” responses; here, I 
consider only the basis judgments associated with accurate recognition of studied objects 
as having been studied. Know judgments were again corrected using the independence 
remember-know procedure (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-model 
ANOVA was used to assess the influence of memory load (present, absent), number of 
possible alternatives (two-option, multi-option), and response to feature statements (yes, 
no) on the proportion of correct recognition judgments based on “remembering”. There 
was a significant effect of memory load, F(1, 177) = 11.16, p = .001, d = 0.49 [.19, .79]. 
Subjects in the load-absent condition based more correct recognition decisions on 
recollection (M = .74, SE = .03) than did subjects in the load-present condition (M = .62, 
SE = .03). There was also significant effect of response type, F(1, 177) = 19. 61, p < .001, 
d = .18 [.08, .28]. Correct recognition of objects that received a “yes” response on the 
initial test were based more on recollection (M = .71, SE = .02) than were objects that 
received a “no” response on the initial test (M = .65, SE = .02). There was no effect of 
number of alternatives on recollection-based accurate recognition, F(1, 177) = 1.52, p = 
.22, ηp2 < .01. Neither the three-way interaction (F(1, 177) = .19, p = .66, ηp2 < .01), the 
response x load interaction (F(1, 177) = 3.24, p = .07, ηp2 = .02), the number of 
alternatives x load interaction (F(1, 177) = .19, p = .66, ηp2 < .01), nor the response x 
number of alternatives interaction (F(1, 177) = .62, p = .43, ηp2 < .01) were significant.  
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-model ANOVA was also used to assess the influence of 
memory load (present, absent), number of possible alternatives (two-option, multi-
option), and response to feature statements (yes, no) on the proportion of correct 
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recognition judgments based on “knowing”. The present manipulations had no effect on 
these familiarity-based judgments. There was no main effect of memory load, F(1, 177) = 
1.66, p = .20, ηp2 < .01; nor of number of alternatives, F(1, 177) = 3.21, p = .08, ηp2 = .02; 
nor of response type, F(1, 177) = 3.36, p = .07, ηp2 = .02. Neither the three-way 
interaction (F(1, 177) = .04, p = .84, ηp2 < .01), the response x load interaction (F(1, 177) 
= 1.95, p = .16, ηp2 = .01), the number of alternatives x load interaction (F(1, 177) = 1.21, 
p = .27, ηp2 < .01), nor the response x number of alternatives interaction (F(1, 177) = .03, 
p = .87, ηp2 < .01) were significant. 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 3, I returned to a list-learning paradigm to examine the potential 
role of memory load at encoding and number of alternative features as moderators of the 
negation effect. Using this paradigm, I successfully replicated the negation effect as seen 
in previous studies, though not of the same magnitude. The measures of subjective 
memory basis suggest that the negation effect in Experiment 3 may be related to 
diminished recollection for objects associated with “no” responses. Additionally, the data 
show that the number of alternatives associated with a feature can influence the 
magnitude of the negation effect. When a feature statement elicited a correct “no” 
response, objects tested with a multi-option feature were less likely to be recognized as 
having been seen before than objects associated with a two-option feature. This suggests 
that an object representation without a pre-defined alternate (i.e., a multi-option feature) 
is particularly susceptible to the negation effect. In contrast, the presence of memory load 
at encoding only increased errors overall, and did not significantly moderate the 
magnitude of the negation effect itself. 
  
Table 3 
Means for final test measures in Experiment 3 in the Load-Absent condition 
 After “yes” After “no” 
 Two-option Multi-option Two-option Multi-option 
Measure Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
False Rejection         
Errors .09 .12 .09 .09 .13 .10 .14 .12 
Confidence 3.11 1.44 3.13 1.58 3.14 1.53 3.10 1.53 
Accurate Recognition         
Response Latency 1624 416 1623 372 1634 388 1694 377 
Confidence 5.46 .77 5.48 .82 5.38 .86 5.33 .91 
Remember .74 .28 .78 .28 .72 .25 .73 .26 
Know (Corrected) .56 .46 .49 .47 .66 .43 .58 .45 
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Table 4 
Means for final test measures in Experiment 3 in the Load-Present condition 
 
 After “yes” After “no” 
 Two-option Multi-option Two-option Multi-option 
Measure Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
False Rejection         
Errors .15 .20 .13 .18 .20 .24 .24 .23 
Confidence 2.72 1.43 2.80 1.71 2.53 1.60 2.62 1.41 
Accurate Recognition         
Response Latency 1591 430 1668 552 1683 461 1767 666 
Confidence 5.21 .98 5.35 .84 4.96 1.09 5.03 .97 
Remember .65 .31 .67 .30 .58 .32 .58 .30 
Know (Corrected) .63 .43 .62 .44 .65 .41 .62 .41 
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Figure 4. Size of negation effect (yes-no difference) for the different number of 
alternatives suggested by a feature statement (two-option, multi-option). Error bars 
represent 95% within-subjects confidence intervals. 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The negation effect refers to the comparative detriment associated with saying 
“no” to a question or statement, versus saying “yes” to a question or statement. A large 
body of literature on language comprehension has examined how negations are 
differentially represented and understood. Several studies have also examined negation 
effects in terms of attention. However, only recently has negation been explored with 
respect to memory for objects. The current experiments thus sought to supplement this 
dearth in research by replicating and assessing potential moderators of the negation effect 
in object recognition. 
Replicability of the Negation Effect 
Overall, these studies show that a negation effect in memory is a replicable 
finding – items associated with a “no” response on an initial test were less likely to have 
been remembered on a final test, compared to items associated with a “yes” response on 
the initial test. Experiment 1 used a list-learning paradigm to conceptually replicate the 
“negation-induced forgetting” effect present in Mayo et al. (2014). The results revealed a 
non-significant memory impairment for objects associated with “no” responses; however, 
the effect size was within the lower bounds of the confidence interval associated with the 
original study. Experiment 2 was conducted in accordance with established best practices 
for conducting replications, outlined by the “replication recipe” (Brandt et al., 2014). I 
corresponded with the primary author to ensure that the proposed replication procedure 
matched that of the original study (Ingredient #1), as well as to obtain the materials used 
in that study (Ingredient #2). Further, I conducted a power analysis to ensure high 
statistical power to detect the effect (Ingredient #3). The replication study was pre-
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registered with the Open Science Framework, thus making complete details about the 
replication available to interested parties (Ingredient #4). Using these replication 
guidelines, significant negation effects were observed for both a laboratory sample (2a) 
and an online sample (2b). The effect size for the online sample was smaller than the 
effect size originally demonstrated by subjects in Experiment 1 of Mayo et al. (2014). 
Experiment 3 involved a return to the list-learning paradigm to investigate two potential 
moderators of the negation effect: the number of alternatives associated with a construct 
(two-option, multi-option), and memory load at encoding (absent, present). Although 
inducing memory load at encoding did not influence the magnitude of the observed 
negation effect, objects tested with multi-option constructs on the initial test 
demonstrated a larger negation effect than did objects tested with two-option constructs. 
An average weighted effect size analysis, using a random effects model, was 
conducted based on the present studies and samples (Exp. 1A and 1B, Exp. 2A and 2B, 
Exp. 3). There was a small to medium effect size across the present studies (k = 5, N = 
395, d = 0.37 [0.28, 0.47]). Additionally, a meta-analytic Bayes factor (BF10) was 
computed by a weighted effect size analysis of the Bayes factors reported in the present 
studies. The observed meta-analytic Bayes factor was much greater than 100, suggesting 
that the data strongly supports the existence of a negation effect, as opposed to the null 
hypothesis of no effect. The original effect size of d = 0.53 reported by Mayo et al. 
(2014) was not encompassed in the average weighted effect size (see Figure 5); however, 
this is not unique to this replication endeavor – replications following the first reported 
effect size often produce weaker evidence (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). 
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Theoretical Mechanisms Leading to Negation 
Though the purpose of the present studies was to examine the replicability of the 
negation effect, it is also important to examine the underlying mechanism influencing the 
impairment following a “no” response. However, thus far, the reason that these negations 
may lead to memory impairment is unclear. Mayo et al. (2014) proposed that, in contrast 
to inhibition of competing concepts (e.g., retrieval-induced forgetting; Anderson, Bjork, 
& Bjork, 1994), the negation of a feature of an item results in the inhibition of the 
representation of the whole item. In retrieval-induced forgetting, this inhibition applies to 
the nontested competitive material. However, the spreading inhibition mechanism 
proposed by Mayo et al. (2014) refers to inhibition of the tested material (i.e., the object). 
Specifically, this mechanism suggests that when a statement describing an incorrect 
feature is negated, this prompts the formation of a temporary mental representation of 
that object with the incorrect feature. That transient representation is then wholly 
suppressed, resulting in the inhibition of that object’s representation (with the correct 
feature) on the later test. Thus, Mayo and colleagues consider their effect in terms of a 
“spreading inhibition” mechanism, as facilitated by attribute-object relationships that are 
presented within the tested statements. Negation is proposed to cause the spread of 
inhibition from the attribute or feature associated with an object, to the object itself. This 
mechanism does not account for differences in the magnitude of the negation effect based 
on the number of alternatives associated with a tested feature. 
An alternative potential mechanism is based on the consideration of number of 
alternatives. In Experiment 3, a greater negation effect was observed when a construct 
implied multiple alternatives rather than two alternatives. Subjects who encountered a 
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feature statement that implied multiple possible alternatives likely considered a multitude 
of these potential attribute-object relationships, which may have led to diminished 
recollection (and increased uncertainty) for the true attribute-object relationship that was 
encoded. The two-option feature statements, however, presented subjects with a more 
absolute scenario that may have reinforced or enhanced their recollection of the encoded 
attribute-object relationship. Thus, the two-option feature statements may function by 
positioning a subject’s memory for an object in a context of “if not this object, then that 
object”, while the ambiguity associated with multi-option feature statements do not lend 
themselves to that context.  
The distinction between two-option and multi-option feature statements on the 
initial memory test may also be conceptualized as analogous to true/false versus multiple-
choice test items, respectively. Brown, Schilling, and Hockensmith (199) observed a 
negative suggestion effect – decreased performance on a test following exposure to 
incorrect alternatives on memory for correct information – that was greater when memory 
was assessed with a multiple-choice test than with a cued-recall test. Subjects in Brown et 
al. (1999) completed an initial cued-recall test over trivia facts, and were then 
administered an interpolated task that re-exposed them to the initially tested items with 
either no incorrect alternatives shown, three incorrect alternatives shown once, or three 
incorrect alternatives shown twice. When no incorrect alternatives were shown on the 
interpolated task, subjects performed better on a second memory test, regardless of delay 
and the number of alternatives. Further, Roediger and Marsh (2005) examined how the 
number of lures on an initial multiple-choice test influenced performance on a later 
memory test. When tested with multiple-choice statements that offered a greater number 
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of alternatives (i.e., a 4-alternative multiple-choice item vs. 2-alternative multiple-choice 
item), subjects produced more of these incorrect alternatives on a final cued-recall test. 
Exposure to lures on an initial test in Brown et al. (1999) and Roediger and Marsh (2005) 
thus impaired performance on a final memory test. Consideration of multiple alternatives 
in the negative suggestion effect studies (as well as the present thesis studies) may have 
resulted in decreased confidence in the correct response and destabilization of the 
memory trace.  
A possible moderator that was not explored in the present studies relates to the 
attentional centrality of an item. All of the items in the conceptual replications (Exp. 1 
and Exp. 3) were centrally framed at encoding: in the list-learning paradigm, subjects 
studied one item at a time in the middle of the screen. Alternatively, the original Mayo et 
al. (2014) Experiment 1 paradigm (and the present Exp. 2) used a video in which 
centrality of, and attention to, the items in the scene could vary. Subjects in the Mayo et 
al. (2014) paradigm watched a video in which multiple items were present in each frame, 
and thus subjects could choose which objects in the video to attend to at any given 
moment. Subjects were encouraged to attend to and encode all of the items being 
presented in the list-learning paradigm, while subjects in the Mayo et al. paradigm had 
more control over the items to which they devote attention. Even using this central 
framing, subjects demonstrated a negation effect, though it was a small negation-related 
impairment by both conventional standards and when compared to the original finding. In 
the misinformation literature, people have been shown to be more susceptible to 
misinformation for peripheral details rather than central details (e.g., Wright & Stroud, 
1998), and this central/peripheral distinction may be due to degraded or inadequate 
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encoding, which could preclude monitoring when misinformation is presented. Based on 
this general finding, it stands to reason that correctly responding “no” may have more of 
an impairment on later memory when the object in question was presented in a 
peripheral, rather than a central, manner. Even though errors in Experiment 3 increased 
overall with the memory load manipulation, degraded encoding in the memory load 
condition did not influence the magnitude of the negation effect. Thus, if item centrality 
is defined as differential encoding strength, it is unclear if manipulating centrality will 
moderate the magnitude of the negation effect or increase errors overall.   
Practical Implications of the Negation Effect in Memory 
Closed-ended questions are prevalent throughout daily communication. Of 
particular interest in the current experiments was whether or not the answers to closed-
ended questions – e.g., yes/no, true/false – can influence what people remember about an 
entity or an event. The data here suggest that the answer one gives in response to a 
statement that elicits either a correct “yes” or a correct “no” can lead to deleterious 
effects in memory.  
After a crime occurs, witnesses may be questioned by police investigators in order 
to provide information about the event. Often these interviews involve asking the witness 
to provide a detailed account of what happened, which is typically followed by an 
investigator asking specific questions of the witness (e.g., Snook, Luther, Quinlan, & 
Milne, 2012). Thinking back to the hypothetical question first posed in the introduction 
(i.e., “was the baseball cap blue?”), the findings from the present studies suggest that a 
correct “no” response may render the witness less likely to remember that the perpetrator 
was wearing a baseball cap at all.  
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Conclusions 
 The present studies offer strong evidence for a negation effect in memory. The 
number of alternatives associated with a tested construct proved to significantly moderate 
the magnitude of the impairment, suggesting that the lack of an easily accessible opposite 
representation increases susceptibility to the negation effect. This susceptibility may be 
due to inhibition of the object’s representation, or due to diminished recollection for the 
object as a function of the type of tested feature. Future studies should assess the 
theoretical mechanism underlying the effect, as well as identify and examine potential 
moderators of the negation effect in memory. Questioning of eyewitnesses serves an 
important function in an investigation, so it is thus imperative that investigators are aware 
that some questioning styles can increase the likelihood of a complete and accurate 
account, while others (e.g., specific questioning) may actually lead to memory deficits.  
 
 
Figure 5. Forest plot of negation effect sizes for Mayo et al. (2014) Experiment 1 
and the present thesis studies.  
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENT 1 QUESTIONS 
Initial Memory Test – “Yes” Initial Memory Test – “No” Object on 
final test 
The umbrella was open. The umbrella was closed. umbrella 
The flag was upright on the 
mailbox. 
The flag was down on the 
mailbox. mailbox 
The cabinet door was open. The cabinet door was closed. cabinet 
The notebook was green. The notebook was blue. notebook 
The coffee mug was full. The coffee mug was empty. coffee mug 
The plastic cup was red. The plastic cup was blue. cup 
The belt was brown. The belt was black. belt 
The cap was off of the 
highlighter. The cap was on the highlighter. highlighter 
The wooden bucket was brown. The wooden bucket was green. bucket 
The coins were silver. The coins were bronze. coin 
The leather bag was open. The leather bag was closed. bag 
The balloon was blue. The balloon was red. balloon 
The anchor was red. The anchor was black. anchor 
The stand mixer was red. The stand mixer was green. mixer 
The cooking pot was orange. The cooking pot was blue. pot 
The bottle was half full of liquid. 
The bottle was completely full of 
liquid. bottle 
The canister was pink. The canister was yellow. canister 
The chair was reclined. The chair was upright. chair 
The tent was orange. The tent was blue. tent 
The lock was a key lock. The lock was a combination lock. lock 
The couch was green. The couch was pink. couch 
The book was open. The book was closed. book 
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The sponge was purple. The sponge was blue. sponge 
The time on the clock read 9:00. The time on the clock read 6:00. clock 
The nail polish was green. The nail polish was purple. nail polish 
There was a loaf of bread inside 
the breadbox. The breadbox was empty. breadbox 
The bag of chips was open. The bag of chips was sealed. chip bag 
The ice cream was in a cone. The ice cream was in a bowl. ice cream 
The twine was white. The twine was brown. twine 
The stapler was purple. The stapler was silver. stapler 
There was writing on the 
chalkboard. The chalkboard was blank. chalkboard 
The tennis shoe laces were 
untied. The tennis shoe laces were tied. shoes 
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APPENDIX B 
EXPERIMENT 1 RKG INSTRUCTIONS 
 
You will see the following 3 options on the screen and choose the one that best describes 
how you remembered seeing the object. 
 
1. I recollect seeing the object. 
2. The object is familiar to me. 
3. I am guessing. 
 
Recollection means that you clearly remembered some particular detail about the object, 
such as the color or size of the object in question. If you used the presence of detail in 
your memory to decide you had studied the object, choose choice #1, “I recollect seeing 
the object.” 
 
In some cases, the object can feel familiar to you, but you cannot remember specific 
details about the object. If you used familiarity to decide you had studied the object, 
choose choice #2, “The object is familiar to me.” 
 
If you simply guessed that you studied the object, choose choice #3, “I am guessing.” 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENT 2 INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Subjects arrive to the experiment and are given instructions to watch a video: 
“In this experiment, you will view a brief film. You will then answer  
questions about what you saw in the film.” 
After viewing the video, participants receive instructions that they will complete a short 
memory task. The specific instructions for the test are as follows: 
“This experiment includes two apartments. You saw one of 
them. At this stage, you will see a series of sentences. Your 
task is to decide whether each sentence refers to the apartment 
that you have seen or to the other apartment. Please press the 
“yes” key if the sentence refers to the apartment that you have 
seen or the “no” key if the sentence refers to the other 
apartment.” 
After completing the filler task, participants are presented with a series of object labels 
(e.g., “chair”) and asked to indicate whether the object was seen in the video. The 
specific instructions are as follows: 
“Your task is to indicate whether each item appeared in the 
apartment that you have seen or in the other apartment. Please 
press the “yes” key if you think that the item appeared in the 
apartment that you have seen or the “no” key if you think that 
the item appeared in the other apartment.”  
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APPENDIX D 
EXPERIMENT 2 QUESTIONS 
Initial Memory Test - “Yes” Initial Memory Test - “No” 
Object on  
final test 
The phone on the wall was a key 
phone. 
The phone on the wall was a dial 
phone. 
phone 
The coffee mugs hanging in the 
kitchen were pink. 
The coffee mugs hanging in the 
kitchen were blue. 
coffee mugs 
The ashtray was full. The ashtray was empty. ashtray 
The candleholders by the TV were 
golden. 
The candleholders by the TV were 
silver. 
candle holders 
The shopping bag by the sink was 
empty. 
The shopping bag by the sink was 
full. 
shopping bag 
The ceiling fan in the living room 
was “on.” 
The ceiling fan in the living room 
was “off.” 
ceiling fan 
The bedside lamp was turned on. The bedside lamp was turned off. bedside lamp 
The painting in the corridor was a 
picture of circles. 
The painting in the corridor was a 
picture of squares. 
painting 
The window shades in the living 
room were closed. 
The window shades in the living 
room were open. 
window 
shades 
The sculpture in the glass cabinet 
was red. 
The sculpture in the glass cabinet 
was blue. 
sculpture 
The carpet in the bedroom was in 
shades of blue. 
The carpet in the bedroom was in 
shades of yellow. 
carpet 
The pillows on the sofa were red. The pillows on the sofa were black. pillows 
The sign on the bathroom door had a 
painting of a person on it. 
The sign on the bathroom door had 
a painting of a duck on it. 
sign on 
bathroom door 
The flowerpot by the stairs was big. The flowerpot by the stars was 
small. 
flowerpot 
The dog on the sofa was lying down. The dog on the sofa was sitting. dog 
The laptop on the coffee table was 
open. 
The laptop on the coffee table was 
closed. 
laptop 
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APPENDIX E 
EXPERIMENT 3 QUESTIONS 
TWO ALTERNATIVES (open/closed, full/empty, up/down/other) 
Initial Memory Test – “Yes” Initial Memory Test – “No” 
Object on  
final test 
The umbrella was open. The umbrella was closed. umbrella 
The cigarette was unlit. The cigarette was lit. cigarette 
The tennis shoe laces were untied. The tennis shoe laces were tied. shoes 
The envelope clasp was fastened. The envelope clasp was unfastened. envelope 
The tissue box was unopened. The tissue box was opened. tissue box 
The cabinet door was closed. The cabinet door was open. cabinet 
The clothes hamper was full. The clothes hamper was empty. hamper 
The mp3 player was turned on. The mp3 player was turned off. mp3 player 
The book was open. The book was closed. book 
The altoid tin was open. The altoid tin was closed. altoid tin 
The pencil cup was full. The pencil cup was empty. pencil cup 
The dryer door was open. The dryer door was closed. dryer 
The briefcase was closed. The briefcase was open. briefcase 
There were letters on the chalkboard. There were numbers on the chalkboard. chalkboard 
The ice cube tray was empty. The ice cube tray was full. ice cube tray 
The poker chips were arranged in 
stacks. 
The poker chips were spread out in a 
pile. poker chips 
The bottle was  full of liquid. The bottle was empty of liquid. bottle 
The coffee mug was empty The coffee mug was full coffee mug 
The cover of the scanner was up. The cover of the scanner was down. scanner 
The flag was down on the mailbox. The flag was upright on the mailbox. mailbox 
The cap was off of the highlighter. The cap was on the highlighter. highlighter 
The backpack was open. The backpack was closed. backpack 
The handle was up on the pail. The handle was down on the pail. pail 
The seat cover was down on the toilet. The seat cover was up on the toilet. toilet 
58 
 
MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES  (color, shape, type) 
Initial Memory Test – “Yes” Initial Memory Test – “No” 
Object on 
final test 
The candle was blue. The candle was red. candle 
The juice was orange juice The juice was apple juice juice 
The stand mixer was green. The stand mixer was red. stand mixer 
The belt was brown. The belt was black. belt 
The stuffed animal was a bear. The stuffed animal was a dog. bear 
The pitcher had a flower on it. The pitcher had a spiral on it. pitcher 
The street sign was a diamond shape The street sign was rectangular street sign 
The notebook was green. The notebook was blue. notebook 
The ornament was polka-dotted. The ornament was striped. ornament 
The ball was a baseball. The ball was a soccer ball. baseball 
The vehicle was a truck. The vehicle was a sports car. truck 
The cookie cutter was shaped like a 
bell. The cookie cutter was shaped like a star. cookie cutter 
The mirror was round The mirror was rectangular mirror 
The spice jar contained chives. The spice jar contained oregano. spice jar 
The tabletop on the coffee table was 
round. 
The tabletop on the coffee table was 
rectangular. coffee table 
The cooking pot was orange. The cooking pot was blue. cooking pot 
The computer key was an E The computer key was an A computer key 
The picnic basket had a plaid design. 
The picnic basket had a gingham 
design. picnic basket 
The anchor was red. The anchor was black. anchor 
The canister was pink. The canister was yellow. canister 
The beach towels were striped. The beach towels were solid. beach towel 
The credit card was a Visa. The credit card was a MasterCard. credit card 
The license plate was from Texas The license plate was from New York license plate 
The balloon was blue. The balloon was red. balloon 
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APPENDIX F 
EXPERIMENT 3 RKG INSTRUCTIONS 
 
We’d like for you to say that you REMEMBER an object if you can remember any 
specific detail of having studied it.  It could be that you remember what it looked like on 
the screen, or what you thought about as you studied it.  If you used the presence of detail 
in your memory to decide that the object was PRESENT, choose choice #1, “I 
REMEMBER seeing the object.”  
 
At other times in your memory, you may simply KNOW that you saw something, but 
you can’t remember any details about it.  So an object may seem familiar, but you can't 
remember any details of seeing it, or any reaction you had to it.  
 
Keep in mind that a KNOW response doesn't necessarily mean you are unsure.  You can 
have a strong feeling that the object is familiar to you, but not remember any specific 
details about having studied it. If you used familiarity to decide that the object was 
PRESENT, choose choice #2, “I KNOW that I saw the object.” 
 
We are interested in which items you REMEMBER and which items you KNOW were 
present in the set of objects you studied.  If you realize that your answer was just a guess, 
say GUESS.  That is, you cannot remember any details about the object, the object 
doesn’t seem overly familiar to you, but rather you’re just hazarding a guess as to 
whether it was in the study phase.   
 
As a reminder, if you say that the object was PRESENT, please describe your memory 
for that object: 
 
REMEMBER -- I remember details about what the object looked like, or what I thought 
about as I saw the object in the study phase 
 
KNOW -- I don’t remember details, but I have a strong feeling that the object is familiar 
to me 
 
GUESS -- I don’t remember details, or have a strong feeling of familiarity; instead, I’m 
just  
       guessing that the object was in the study phase 
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APPENDIX G 
 
IRB APPROVAL FOR EXPERIMENTS 
  
